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Eugene E. Ruyle, 1 F. T. Cloak, Jr., 2 L. B. Slobodkin, 3 
and William H. Durham 4 
The following comments and reply concern Wiltiam H. Durham's article 
"The Adaptive Significance of Cultural Behavior," published in Human Ecology, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1976. 
COMMENT 
F. T. Cloak, Jr. 
In "The Adaptive Significance of Cultural Behavior," William H. Durham's 
handling of methodological and factual materials is far more successful than his 
effort at theory building. A method of determining and/or predicting the costs 
and benefits to individual fitness of various behaviors (Durham, 1976a; 104) 
would be most worthwhile, both for cultural studies (e l  Durham, 1976a: 98) 
and for studies of human genetics. And I hope, with Durham(1976a; 96), that 
students of both sorts will agree to use "adaptation" and its variants to refer 
to fitness-enhancing outcomes of cultural behavior. 
Durham's examples, his "supporting evidence" (1976a: 106-113), are well 
chosen, well handled, and quite convincing. I applaud his successful effort there- 
by to show, eontra certain anthropologists, that culture does have causal rela- 
tions to genetic fitness and, conversely, contra certain biologists and publicists, 
that pro-fitness behaviors may be acquired culturally and not genetically. [But 
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his notion that people have an innate ability to recognize and adopt cultural 
features that are good for them and to recognize and reject cultural features that 
are bad for them (1976a: 97,105) seems unintentionally to reintroduce a genetic 
determinism of culture.] 
The essence of Durham's thesis, however, is that most cultural determi- 
nants of human behaviors tend to increase (or at least not to diminish) the num- 
ber of children begotten or borne by the behaver and/or his/her relatives, i.e., 
they enhance his/her inclusive fitness. 
Of course they do. The explanation, which Durham appears to have over- 
looked (1976a: 94), is quite simple: it is a near-universal contingent fact (not 
a theoretical principle) that human beings, as a rule, rear and enculturate their 
own children. Wherever that is true, a cultural instruction whose behavior 
helps its human carrier-enactor (or his/her relatives) to acquire more children 
thereby has more little heads to get copied into. Thus cultural instructions that 
enhance inclusive fitness propagate through populations as generations go by, 
until most extant cultural instructions have that effect. (For a more thorough 
discussion of cultural instructions, see Cloak, 1975: 162-169.) 
Recognition of that simple explanation of Durham's "theory" leads to 
further observations: 
1. As outlined, and despite "'convention" (Durham, 1976a: 91), the process 
is simply one form of natural selection of cultural instructions (Cloak, 
1975: 168-170). The reader can test that statement by substituting 
"gene" for "cultural instruction" and "genome" for "head," in the ex- 
planation above, starting after "true." The term "cultural selection" and 
its variants are redundant, here as elsewhere. [Marvin Harris's well-known 
thesis about India's sacred cattle excellently exemplifies this form of 
natural selection of cultural instructions-  not, as Durham (1976a: 91) 
erroneously concludes, of genetic instructions.] 
2. The process has absolutely nothing to do with what happens to the 
carrier-enactor's genotype. A cultural instruction which helped its carrier 
adopt children would be selected for in exactly the same way and be just 
as successful, yet it would in no way enhance the carrier's genetic fitness; 
indeed, it would probably enhance the fitness of the children's natural 
parents at the expense of the carrier's fitness. So the fact that successful 
cultural instructions often enhance genetic fitness is merely an accidental 
truth, an empirical generalization of no theoretical import. (A factual 
thesis more generally true than Durham's would be that most cultural 
determinants of human behaviors tend to increase, or at least not to di- 
minish, the number of children encuIturated by the behaver and/or his/ 
her relatives.) 
3. Nothing said here, or by Durham, theoretically precludes other cultural 
instructions being successful through other pathways, even though actu- 
ally maladaptive (detrimental to carrier's inclusive fitness). [Cf Feldman 
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and Lewontin (1975:1166): "Our recent work indicates t h a t . . ,  pheno- 
types acquired by learning or other modes of cultural transmission can 
spread through a population even though they lower the fitness of the 
individuals showing the phenotype." Indeed, at least one successful gene 
is maladaptive - the T allele in the house mouse (Williams, 1966:119).] 
A maladaptive behavior may become widespread because the real unit of 
natural selection (contra Durham, 1976: 92) is not the organism but the unit 
that replicates i tself--the genetic or cultural instruction. An instruction of 
either kind succeeds (proliferates) or fails in the environment in which it hap- 
pens to occur, according to the effects on that environment of its behavior. 
There is no theoretical basis whatever for predicting that a certain kind of en- 
vironmental effect, such as organism construction, maintenance, or reproduc- 
tion, is more likely to lead to success than any other kind; to make such predic- 
tions, one has to make factual assumptions about environments-in-general (such 
as Durham's apparent unconscious assumption about environments where 
humans are enculturated), or to make factual determinations about a parti- 
cular environment in question. 
[By the way, Durham (1976a: 105) misunderstands and misrepresents 
my remarks on the possibility of maladaptive cultural behaviors (Cloak, 1975: 
171-172). I said "a cultural instruction is [not "culture evolves"] . . .  like an 
active parasite." I went on to say, "It may be in complete mutual symbiosis with 
the human host, in which case the behavior it produces has survival value for it- 
self through the value it has for the survival/reproduction of the host." From that 
statement, one surely ,could as well predict Durham's Fig. 1C as his 1D (1976a: 
103): We have no quarrel at all about the facts; for reasons of theoretical ex- 
position, however, I emphasized maladaptive instructions.] 
4. Theoretically, then, instructions are primary, and their phenotypic pro- 
ducts are secondary, mere instruments by which instructions succeed (if 
they succeed). Such instruments include organisms and modifications 
thereof: genetic instructions (genes) build organisms, and genetic and cul- 
tural instructions modify them, and the instructions thereby succeed. 
Some cultural instructions modify (or program) humans to build arti- 
facts and social forms, again instruments of the instruction's success-- 
probably, but not necessarily, through their contribution to the instruc- 
tion-carrier's survival and/or reproduction. (Just how instructions co- 
operate to produce structures of marvellous complexity, efficiency, and 
beauty is of course a fascinating subject of empirical inquiry, as are the 
questions of how they compete and how they exploit and domesticate 
each other and each other's products. Here, however, we are concerned 
with why they do so, when they do.) 
5. Another result of the organism-modification process is the construction 
of the physiological (neural and humoral) bases of"wants" and "needs .... 
what Campbell (1965: 41) has perceptively called vicarious selection sys- 
52 Ruyle, Cloak, Slobodkin, and Durham 
terns. Those want-and-need instructions, through their products, control 
the environment in which other instructions succeed or fail. As a rule, 
of course, they favor instructions whose behavior contributes to their 
success, usually by contributing to their carrier's fitness. 
Summary 
Fundamentally, theoretically, there is only one process underlying genetic 
and cultural evolution: natural selection. Organism fitness-enhancement ("adap- 
tive significance") is one of its practical mechanisms; group formation and main- 
tenance is another, often but not always through fitness-enhancement; and need- 
fulfillment is still another. If Durham can accept that formulation, and switch 
from "organism-thinking" to "instruction-thinking" (Cloak, 1975: 178), he will 
free himself from two handicaps: First, he can forget his worries about "reduc- 
tionism" and "determinism" (1976a: 100, 101). Under this general theory of 
natural selection, cultural evolution is biological evolution, continued by "other" 
(nongenetic) means. Second, he will spare himself the appearance of anthropo- 
morphism, mentalism, and wishy-washiness attendant on his discussion of kinds 
of "significance," other than adaptive "significance," of cultural behaviors 
(1976a: 102-106, 115). 
Conclusions 
Every instruction's success (or failure) depends on its environment, which 
includes every other instruction in its biotope -- cultural or genetic -- and the 
phenotypic outcomes thereof, including organisms, behaviors, artifacts, and 
social forms. (For example, the genetic and cultural instructions that cause 
people to rear and enculturate their own children are a very salient part of the 
environment of all cultural instructions which follow Durham's route to success.) 
Thus the theoretical relation Durham seeks is not a simple complementarity be- 
tween one thing called "human biology" and another thing called "culture," 
but something far more complex: it is an ecological relation (cf. Cloak, 1975: 
175) among a myriad of individual instructions. We do need "a general theory 
for the coevolution of human biology and culture" (Durham, 1976a: 116); we 
will find it, however, not by prejudging the relevance of instructional products 
to the survival and reproductive needs of individual organisms or groups thereof, 
but by tracing the pathways, wherever they lead, by which instructional pro- 
ducts meet the survival and replicative needs of the instructions, genetic and 
cultural, that produced them. In other words, attempting to explain a behavior, 
one should ask not "What does this behavior do for the organism's fitness?" 
but "How does this behavior help make places, in this environment, for the 
genetic and cultural instructions that it expresses?" 
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COMMENT 
Eugene E. Ruyle 
Durham's recent article in this journal (1976a) is a valuable contribution 
to the growing literature on biological interpretations of cultural evolution. 
There are three areas where I feel Durham is on the right track. First, I was pleased 
by his stress on natural selection at the individual level (incorporating the con- 
cept of inclusive fitness, a concept which is not as new as sometimes thought; 
see Haldane, 1966: 131) as the decisive force in biological evolution, particu- 
larly since this point is weakened in the recent, widely acclaimed work of Wil- 
son (1975). Second, I was pleased to see Durham's criticisms of the sometimes 
rather casual application of the concept of  natural (genetic) selection to the 
explanation of cultural phenomena (Wilson, again, has been criticized in this 
regard; see Allen et al., 1975). Third, I found Durham's use of cost/benefit 
analysis stimulating, particularly in pointing out the relative freedom of low- 
cost activities. 
However, I cannot accept Durham's rejection of the satisfaction crite- 
rion for cultural selection, nor can I accept his suggestion (pp. 9%99) that 
"humans tend to behave in ways which maximize the propagation of their 
genes." I find Durham's position in this regard both inelegant and untenable. 
My remarks are directed toward this point. 
Both biological and cultural evolution are characterized by adaptation, 
if this term is used in its broad sense of refering to a "fit" between an organism 
and its environment. This fit, however, is maintained by quite different mecha- 
nisms. In the case of biological or genetic evolution, the mechanism is natural 
selection, or the differential reproduction of individuals. This selective mecha- 
nism leads to the selective criterion, inclusive fitness. Since offspring obtain 
their genetic materials more or less unchanged from their parents, it is axio- 
matic that those genetically based traits that improve the relative reproductive 
efficiency of individuals will tend to increase proportionately in the gene pool. 
This process of natural selection is adaptation, in the strict sense of the term 
(cf  Harris, 1960). 
In the case of cultural evolution, however, the selective mechanism is quite 
different. Offspring may and in most cases probably do derive much of their 
cultural repertoire from their sociological parents (who may or may not be 
their biological parents), but (1) other social agents such as friends, "big men," 
and schools are also important in the enculturation process, and (2) cultural 
evolution can occur even within the life span of an individual, in contrast to the 
necessarily cross-generational nature of  genetic evolution. This means that the 
test of adaptation in the strict sense (but not the broad sense) is lacking, unless 
one posits, as Durham in fact does (p. 97), the existence of internal structural 
rules which guide the selective retention of cultural traits according to the crite- 
rion of inclusive fitness. I find this rather dubious but note that, even were such 
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internal rules present, they would operate, as Durham notes, by providing 
"pleasurable sensory reinforcements" for certain behaviors, that is, by making 
these behaviors satisfying. 
Therefore, unlike the case in genetic evolution, it is not axiomatic that 
those individuals with the most offspring make the greatest contribution to the 
culture of succeeding generations. What is axiomatic in cultural evolution is 
that individuals behave in ways that are pleasurable (satisfying) to them. This 
is axiomatic since the test of satisfaction is the behavior of individuals, just as 
the test of fitness is the leaving of offspring. People do things because they are, 
for whatever reason, satisfying, just as genetic traits increase because they con- 
tribute, for whatever reason, to differential reproduction. In other words, the 
satisfaction criterion, like the fitness criterion in genetic evolution, is tautol- 
ogical, and therefore irrefutable. Its value lies in the fact that it forces us to 
explain how a particular trait contributes to the satisfaction of individuals (and, 
indeed, who these individuals are, what their needs are, and how these needs are 
formed), just as the synthetic theory of bioevolution forces us to explain how a 
particular trait contributes to the differential reproduction of individuals (cf 
Harris, 1968: 240-241). 
Now, this concept of satisfaction subsumes the concept of inclusive fit- 
ness. Durham, unfortunately, misunderstands my argument (Ruyle, 1973)when 
he claims that "the satisfaction cr i te r ion . . ,  is scarcely adequate for explaining 
cultural patterns of fertility control by abstinence or infanticide" (p. 106), and 
"the general standard suggested for the selective retention of cultural traits 
(satisfaction) could easily result in noncomplementary, nonadaptive hedonism" 
(io. 116). But satisfaction as a selective criterion leads to adaptation in the broad 
sense of the term simply because it is rarely satisfying to be maladapted. Square 
wheels, crooked spears, and sickly children are unlikely to provide much satis- 
faction. The raising of viable offspring and grand-offspring is almost universally 
satisfying for human beings. Once these facts are taken into account, Durham's 
objections must disappear. Satisfaction is the mechanism which maintains adapta- 
tion and, in most cases, inclusive fitness, in cultural evolution. To insist on in- 
clusive fitness as Durham does is to hold to an approximate and partial expla- 
natory tool instead of a more direct and complete one. 
Durham acknowledges this by noting that the concept of inclusive fitness 
is a tool to aid our understanding of human behavior, not necessarily the tool or 
even the best tool for all human behaviors (p. 102). Durham seems to imply, 
however, that supplementary explanations are limited to low-cost activities 
(p. 115), but this is untenable. In most cases, I suspect, there is no contradic- 
tion between inclusive fitness and satisfaction, but there is abundant evidence 
that, where there is, satisfaction wins out. For example, for the sake of his poli- 
tical convictions Karl Marx endured a poverty so bitter that it caused the death 
of several of his children. If Marx had been behaving in a way to maximize the 
propagation of his genes he could easily enough have followed an orthodox 
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legal career and reared a larger family, but had he done so his influence on sub- 
sequent cultural evolution would have been nil. Similarly with Lenin, who con- 
sciously decided not to have children in order to devote himself to the revolu- 
tion. The subsequent growth and spread of communism in the twentieth century 
have been based on massive self-sacrifice and nonpropagation of genes by in- 
dividuals. Presumably all this was ideologically and politically satisfying to 
the individuals concerned, even though it entailed considerable cost. Cultural 
evolution is quite simply inexplicable without understanding such phenomena, 
examples of which could easily enough be multiplied. 
A final point. Durham's attempt to shackle cultural evolution to an essen- 
tially mechanistic process ignores the most significant aspect of humanity. 
Cultural behavior is the conscious, purposeful, and meaningful activity of human 
beings, who create ideas in order to satisfy their own needs. (This is not to deny 
the force of custom, nor that human activity is often short-sighted and often 
leads to unanticipated results.) This human characteristic was created by the 
~'blind" forces of biological evolution. However, it makes cultural evolution 
fundamentally different in kind from biological evolution, in which genes are 
created and altered by biochemical forces and selected according to an essen- 
tially mechanistic criterion. This difference opens the way for considerations of 
human happiness and even progress in cultural evolution, considerations which 
are quite properly excluded from the study of  biological evolution as irrelevant. 
The gulf between humanity and other creatures, in short, is as great as the gulf 
between life and nonlife~ and any theory of cultural evolution which fails to 
grasp this is doomed to failure. 
COMMENT 
L. B. Slobodkin 
There is a curious but quite definite distinction between "advantageous" 
and "having selective advantage." An advantageous behavior or morphology 
confers some benefit on an organism where the concept of benefit is defined by 
arbitrary agreement and may even include an improvement in the organism's 
likelihood of being an ancestor. "Having a selective advantage," by contrast, 
refers to a very tightly defined evolutionary situation in which the genetic pro- 
perties of some particular class of organisms within a population in some parti- 
cular environmental context confer on their possessors the capacity to increase 
the relative frequency of their type of genes in the population concomitant with 
a relative diminution of other types of genes. 
Therefore, as Durham points out, the demonstration that a particular be- 
havioral property would have selective advantage if individuals of differing geno- 
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type differed in that behavior does not in any way demonstrate that in fact it 
does have selective advantage in any usual evolutionary sense. This is of  ab- 
solutely central importance. In fact, this criticism is at the heart of  the current 
controversy over the doctrines of  Alexander, Wilson, and Trivers. That is, the 
general argument which Durham is criticizing and which must be very seriously 
criticized is " I f  we can show a cultural trait or property (usually rather loosely 
defined) to be the kind of  thing that would have selective advantage if it were 
in any way genetically determined, then, since so many things are, at least in 
part, genetically determined, there probably really is some genetic basis for the 
behavior. We may not have discovered it yet. There is a kind of  parsimony in say- 
ing that that behavior represents the outcome of  a long-term selective process." 
As Durham points out, there are several things wrong with this argument. 
If  someone were to say that the behavioral differences between sparrows in New 
York City and sparrows in the countryside were genetic, we would demand that 
certain experiments be done to demonstrate this genetic basis. We would not be 
generally satisfied by a plausibility argument which says that so many things are 
genetic that this must be genetic, too. Are we to be satisfied with less definitive 
data and theory with regard to human behavioral differences or regularities? 
It is possible to say that we cannot experiment with people the same way 
as with sparrows and therefore we deal with a kind of  likelihood assertion. But, 
really, what kind of  likelihood is it? 
There are well-known and clear-cut examples of  genetic differences be- 
tween persons altering their behavior in significant ways, so that persons suffer- 
ing from various metabolic deficiencies (say, Tay-Sachs disease or porphyria) 
may behave in a curious fashion (Ehrman and Parsons, 1976). The well-analyzed 
cases of human behavioral genetic difference do not involve the kind of  traits 
that are considered by Alexander, Wilson, and Trivers. 
Dr. J. Sohn has pointed out to me an interesting statement in Maimonides' 
Guide to the Perplexed, Chapter 49: 
It is well known that man requires friends all his lifetime . . . .  When man is in 
good health and prosperous he enjoys the company of his friends. In times of 
trouble he is in need of them. In old age when his body is weak he is assisted by 
them. This love is more frequent and more intense between parents and children 
and among other relations. Perfect love, brotherhood and mutual assistance is 
only found among those near to each other by relationship. The members of a 
family united by common descent from the same grandfather, or even some more 
distant ancestor, have towards each other a certain feeling of love, help each 
other and sympathize with each other . . . .  
It is the apparent contention of  Alexander, Wilson, and Trivers that these 
feelings, modulated by distance of relationship, represent a deep genetic pro- 
perty of  man and that somehow it is genetically natural for man to feel this way. 
No explicit genetic analysis has been made. It is of  interest that Maimonides 
did not consider this to be instinctive, because his passage continues: "To affect 
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this [sense of love and mutual assistance] is one of the chief purposes of  the 
Law." That is, one cannot rely on men to naturally feel this way. One imposes 
laws which encourage this feeling, and the remainder of his passage is concerned 
with tile rules of divorce, fidelity, and the relationship between married persons 
and families. The idea that cultural insitutions such as law are the cause of these 
warm feelings is refutable by saying that cultural institutions are reflections of 
the genetically based feelings themselves. It should be apparent by now that one 
can build vast polemical structures on this subject without any particular end. 
Note the claim by Wilson (1976) that the time has come "for ethics to 
be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized 
[sic]" and that "The question that science is now in a position to answer is the 
very origin and meaning of human values from which all ethical pronouncements 
and much of political practice flow." 
Even relatively simple-sounding assertions about the genetic basis of human 
traits other than the grossly morphological or biochemical are at tile moment 
extremely controversial (el Kamin, 1974). One may ask why are suppositions 
about frankly nonexistent genetic analyses being presented as if they repre- 
sented scientific communication? That question is probably impossible to 
analyze satisfactorily in what is meant to be a brief comment on another article. 
I will simply note the possibility that it is related to the oracular role that has 
been imposed on scientists in the popular imagination and the temptation to 
fulfill that oracular role in response to an ever-present, eager audience. 
The presentation of loose plausibility arguments as if they were fact, or 
as if they had the weight of  normal scientific theory, is not particularly danger- 
ous in, for example, the study of the evolution of bryozoans or bryophytes, 
but it is, curiously enough, precisely in such fields as the evolution of bryozoans 
that the most rigid of scientific standards are applied before a work is permitted 
to be published and promulgated. In the area of human behaviorial evolution 
there is a tendency to be looser, rather than more stringent, in the intellectual 
criteria applied, as if the depth of our ignorance about human behavior required 
us to say something at all cost rather than to remain silent. This is an extremely 
dangerous state of affairs from both the political and the social standpoint (see 
Allen etal., 1975). 
Durham very properly dissociates himself from this curious kind of analy- 
sis but then substitutes an analogy between the process of cultural change and 
that of evolutionary change, which does not rely on any assumed genetic infra- 
structure. 
He introduces a theory of complementarity between biological and cul- 
tural evolution in which the process of cultural evolution seems to involve 
selective retention of particular cultural properties and in which the coupling 
between biological and cultural evolution is by a fitness criterion. That is, it 
is considered to be highly unlikely that there would be selective retention of a 
cultural property which tends to lower fitness. 
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If there were real fitness differences in the genetic sense between indivi- 
duals or between groups within cultures or even between cultures, then we would 
anticipate that there would not be selective retention of cultural traits which 
tend to lower such fitness unless they are appealing for some other reason. The 
arguments of Alexander, Wilson, and Trivers would say that people would have 
a genetic tendency to avoid the appeal of such cultural properties. I suspect that 
this implies that eventually we will have a genetic aversion to cigarette smoking 
but I am not at all sure. I am certainly not sure enough to feel that I have 
gained a deep insight of human behavior by considering the problem in this way. 
In the absence of any documentation that culturally significant behavior is de- 
pendent on observed genetic differences, Durham's statement that "people are 
not likely to harvest energy either in a way or in amounts that would cause 
them reduced fitness" is not very meaningful. 
In his conclusions, Durham states: "I do not believe.. ' ,  behaviors are 
controlled by genes whose frequencies were increased by natural selection." 
Curiously enough, I do. That is, I am almost certain that in the process of devel- 
opment of the primates there were at one time changes in behaviorally signifi- 
cant genes as a consequence of natural selection. This in no way says that that 
process is going on at the present time. In fact, one can quite readily build a 
model of extremely high behavioral flexibility in which the flexibility itself is 
a genetic property, and, if that flexibility is sufficiently high, it becomes almost 
impossible for gene frequencies to be materially altered by specific environ- 
mental pressures unless these are of extremely long duration and extremely 
great force. I develop this argument at greater length elsewhere (Slobodkin, 
1977a,b). Durham continues: " R a t h e r . . .  this correlation may largely result 
from a complementary process of cultural selection which influences the re- 
tention of cultural traits according to the same criterion as natural selection (i.e., 
inclusive f i tness) . . .  ," I do not believe that he has developed the details of this 
analogy sufficiently to permit us, for example, to use any of the more formal 
theories of population genetics as paradigms for cultural evolution, and, until 
it is developed in that way, it becomes very difficult to criticize more expli- 
citly. Perhaps the clearest item in the conclusion is that there exists a spectrum 
ranging from complete genetic control to complete nongenetic control in be- 
havior and that any theories which attempt to assign 100% genetic control or 
100% nongenetic control are empty at best. 
There is a complex evolutionary theory which addresses itself to the 
question of what are the genetic mechanisms which determine the amount of 
environmental vs. genetic control (Waddington, 1957; Bradshaw, 1965). This 
type of evolutionary theory may provide a biological basis for the fact of com- 
plementarity in human systems. For the moment, however, the genetic com- 
ponent of anthropological theory remains obscure. Durham performs a service 
in denying one class of simplistic assertions. His planned substitute analysis is 
an improvement but obviously must be more fully developed in later studies. 
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REPLY 
59 
William H. Durham 
With the publication of E. O. Wilson's book (1975), Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis, the relationship between human biology and culture has once 
again emerged as a major issue in the public and academic press. Unfortunately, 
it does not appear that the relationship has been clarified to any great extent by 
the recent attention. Sociobiology, defined as the study of the biological basis of  
social behavior in any animal species, proposes that many forms of human cultural 
behavior are genetically inherited and therefore a product of natural selection. 
Far from being the new synthesis we were waiting for, this is really only a more 
sophisticated brand of the disciplinary chauvinism we suffered before. There is 
still not adequate allowance for nongenetic factors in the making of adaptive 
human phenotypes. 
Now more than ever, I feel I must point out the dangers inherent in human 
sociobiology and I must reemphasize the conceptual differences of the theory I 
have proposed. In the first place, disciples of sociobiology in anthropology and 
biology must bear in mind the following: 
1. The demonstration that a trait is adaptive (i.e., fitness-enhancing) for 
human beings by no means proves it to be the result of  natural selection 
and genetic inheritance. Because culture has been the more important 
means of human adaptation in recent millennia (a point agreed upon by 
Wilson and others), we have no reason to postulate a predominantly 
genetic basis for a given behavior until cultural mechanisms of adaptation 
are shown insufficient to explain the frequency and distribution of the 
character. 
2. The demonstration that a trait is universal or almost universal among 
human societies also tells us nothing about its having a genetic basis or 
not. Similar behaviors in a variety of  societies can easily result from 
cultural means of adaptation. A practice can become widespread through 
either independent cultural evolution or diffusion, and may even be re- 
tained for different reasons in nonsimilar habitats. 
3. Even the demonstration of a phylogenetic history of a trait cannot be 
accepted as unconditional proof of its genetic origin in human beings. 
First, there is good evidence that the adaptations of  other primates, for 
example, include an important amount of  learning (Kummer, 1971). 
Second, even if a given social behavior in another primate society is 
shown to have genetic transmission, this does nothing more than suggest 
the possibility that the behavior evolved primarily in the same way in 
humans. 
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In short, good sociobiologists will not continue to argue or advocate the 
hypothesis that behavior X has a genetic basis, not  even when they know it to be 
adaptive and widespread. Instead, they will present sound evidence that requires 
rejecting the null hypothesis that behavior X is not genetically acquired. Curiously, 
none of the evidence marshalled by sociobiologists to date has made possible a 
convincing rejection of the null hypothesis for any form of human social be- 
havior. Actually, this may not be so surprising as it s eems-  there are good 
reasons why cultural processes probably account for the origin and maintenance 
of more forms of human social behavior than genetic processes (see Durham, 
1976a, pp. 100-101). 
The major differences between hard-line sociobiology and the theory I pro- 
pose are two. First, I argue that the observed consistencies between human be- 
havior and biological theory may largely result from a complementary process 
of cultural evolution. The process I envision would promote the adaptation of 
human beings to their social and physical environments by cultural means, but 
it would still be adaptation in the biological sense. Second, I do not suggest 
that all human activities make perfect sense in terms of fitness. As a general 
rule, the utility of fitness arguments for understanding a given human behavior 
is expected to increase in proportion to the behavior's phenotypic costs to the 
behaver. Customary high-cost behaviors are expected to be fitness-enhancing 
almost without exception. Low-cost behaviors may very well have no important 
relation to fitness. In the case of human beings, the adaptiveness of a trait is 
therefore not necessarily its most important feature. 
When I first formalized the thoughts behind "The Adaptive Significance 
of Cultural Behavior" into a manuscript, I was afraid these points were almost 
too self-evident to publish. The earnest and thought-provoking comments of 
these reviewers suggest otherwise, and their criticisms deserve to be carefully 
considered. 
The major comment by Eugene Ruyle is that satisfaction, not fitness, is 
the most direct and complete explanatory tool for human behavior. His position 
follows logically from the axiomatic assertion that human beings always behave 
in ways that are pleasurable or satisfying to them. Since pleasurable activities are 
not always fitness-enhancing (a point we agree on), fitness will therefore not be 
as useful a measure as satisfaction. 
This argument, Ruyle declares, is tautological and therefore irrefutable. 
What makes it tautological is the meaning that "satisfaction" takes on for not be- 
ing explicitly defined. If the test of satisfaction is postulated to be the (repeated) 
behavior of individuals, then satisfaction must logically be defined as "whatever 
leads individuals to repeat a behavior." This of course is not a particularly satis- 
fying notion of satisfaction. It does include everything, it is complete, but it also 
tells us nothing. If Ruyle really wants to say something more profound, he will 
have to define satisfaction explicitly and describe for us a few of the properties 
he wishes it to have. Unfortunately, I suspect that this is neither a trivial request 
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nor a simple oversight on Ruyle's part. Within any sound definition of satisfac- 
tion will be implied answers to a number of tricky questions concerning the op- 
eration of selective retention. For example, if a human being is faced with a 
choice between a number of alternative cultural practices, will he or she gene- 
rally choose the most satisfying? Can satisfactions always be quantified or at 
least rank-ordered as that would imply? What happens if the alternatives are 
satisfying in different ways? What happens if one is more satisfying in the short 
term and another in the long term? If Ruyle wants to use a selective retention 
model for cultural evolution, he will have to explain satisfaction more care- 
f u l l y -  in a way that makes possible its use as a yardstick for comparing alter- 
native practices. 
At times I get the feeling that Ruyle wants satisfaction to mean some- 
thing other than its implicit definition. He suggests, for example, that he means 
satisfaction in the sense of pleasure. If  so, that is, if Ruyle really wants pleasure 
to be his criterion, then his argument is no longer tautological and irrefutable. 
"Whatever leads individuals to repeat a behavior" is not necessarily pleasurable 
sensory feedback. His proposition thereby becomes a hypothesis which requires 
testing just like any other: "people tend to behave in ways that produce plea- 
surable sensory reinforcement." In this case, he should not ask us to accept the 
truth of  his assertion. Our task should be to test it. 
That brings me to another point. Ruyle argues that satisfaction is a more 
encompassing and therefore more basic or complete criterion of selective re- 
tention than fitness. This claim is derived from his observation that "it is rarely 
satisfying to be maladapted." If  the latter is true, and if people always behave 
in satisfying ways, then people will rarely counter their fitnesses, he continues, 
in all the various satisfying things they may do. I wonder if Ruyle has ever 
backed up one more step to ask why is it rarely satisfying to be maladapted? 
Why is it that "Square wheels, crooked spears, and sickly children are unlikely 
to provide much satisfaction"? I submit that the theory that can answer these 
questions, not just assume them as given "facts," is more basic and complete. 
My hunch is that square wheels, crooked spears, and sickly children are un- 
likely to provide much satisfaction because they are unlikely to provide much 
fitness. 
The relationship between adaptation and satisfaction can probably be ex- 
plained as follows. Presumably throughout the organic evolution of hominids 
there was a persistent (genetic) selective advantage for the coupling of sensory 
reinforcements with acts likely to enhance fitness and for coupling unpleasant 
or painful feedback with potentially dangerous behaviors. Presumably the capa- 
city for culture began evolving when there was already some coupling of this 
kind. Since we may assume that this capacity for culture evolved for its adapt- 
ive benefits, culture would be very unlikely to uncouple completely or indeed 
to reverse the association of fitness-enhancing activities and satisfactions. As ex- 
plained in my article, it is reasonable to suggest that that this association has be- 
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come appreciably looser with the influence of culture (e.g., there certainly exist 
pleasurable low-cost activities which contribute essentially nothing to fitness, 
Fig. 1C in Durham, 1976a). Still, we would not expect to find satisfaction re- 
sulting from grossly maladaptive cultural behaviors. 
Therefore, I agree with Ruyle when he says, "In most cases, I suspect, 
there is no contradiction between inclusive fitness and satisfaction," but I be- 
lieve that this correlation and its limits are actually predicted by fitness and that 
they are not predicted by satisfaction. For this reason, I maintain that fitness is 
the more complete measure, and I suspect it will also prove more useful for the 
analysis of high-cost behaviors. On the other hand, I absolutely agree that fitness 
may often be indirect and unnecessary for explaining low-cost activities. When 
satisfaction is properly defined, Ruyle's theory should be very useful in the 
lower left-hand corner of Fig. 1C of my article. 
Finally, I see neither "abundant" nor compelling evidence that where fit- 
ness and satisfaction arguments really are at odds (i.e., in the case of high-cost 
behaviors) "satisfaction wins out." At the risk of gross injustice to Karl Marx 
in these few paragraphs, let us reconsider Ruyle's proposed counterexample. 
In the first place, Ruyle suggests that the life of Marx himself is a good example 
that the pursuit of satisfaction may lead people to behave in ways that do 
not maximize their fitnesses. Before discarding the fitness hypothesis on these 
grounds, we must always remember that any given individual case can neither 
make nor break a general, statistical prediction of tendency. As a matter of 
fact, if a chosen counterexample is widely recognized for being unusual or ex- 
aggerated, the exceptional case may ironically support the general tendency. I 
wonder, then, if the unusual dedication of Marx to his cause (perhaps that of 
Jesus Christ as well) doesn't actually reinforce my argum6nt for the general 
case. (In this discussion I will ignore along with Ruyle the reproduction of 
Marx's relatives and any possible manipulation by his parents.) 
Second, in reference to Marxism, I must say that, again, I do not find the 
compelling contradiction that Ruyle implies. While this may not be the best 
way to interpret Marxism, I believe it is fair to say that Marxists realize that ex- 
isting social structures generally serve to maintain and even increase the re- 
productive and related advantages of the rich at the expense of the poor (see 
Meek, 1971). In a sense, Marxism seeks to deflect the perpetration of such 
inequity, and Marx realized, as do his followers, that considerable self-sacrifice 
may be necessary to effect that change. Before we leap to any conclusion about 
"massive self-sacrifice and nonpropagation of genes" behind this behavior, it 
would be good to remember (1) that the poor may have relatively little to lose 
and potentially much to gain (either of fitness or of its supporting resources) 
and (2) that individual sacrifices are often seen as worthwhile for the benefits 
expected to follow for one's descendants. In this light, perhaps even the ex- 
treme sacrifice of Marx himself becomes understandable. In the article, I 
briefly discussed the possibility of cultural inertia in the event of an environ- 
mental change. It is clear that I should have included cultural forecasting as 
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well. Marx might be considered an outstanding example of the human potential 
to modify behavior in anticipation of predicted environmental changes. His be- 
havior will seem altruistic only to those who do not anticipate such changes. 
I believe that the remaining points Ruyle makes are simply elaborations 
and restatements of propositions already included in the text (e.g., the contrast 
between purposeful cultural evolution and blindly mechanistic biological evolu- 
tion is a point I make, albeit with less fanfare, in the section on Determinism). 
Turning now to F. T. Cloak's comments, I find "instructional thinking" to 
be a new and more sophisticated formulation of the older, complete analogy be- 
tween biology and culture (see Murdock, 1956, for example). This analogy pro- 
poses that alternative forms of cultural instructions compete for representation 
in the total pool of instructions just the way that genes do. Those instructions 
that successfully replicate more copies than do other variants will ultimately in- 
crease in frequency -- a process that Cloak considers natural selection, no more, 
no less. By this reasoning, what has fitness is not the carrier organism but the 
instruction itself; instructions are therefore expected to maximize their own re- 
productive success. 
With respect to biological evolution, instructional thinking is normally 
equivalent to organism thinking for the simple reason that the replication of 
instructions occurs through the reproduction of the organism. On the other hand, 
the transmission of cultural instructions is not restricted to that act of fertiliza- 
tion, as we all know. An organism can continually acquire new cultural instruc- 
tions and from a wide variety of sources. This is where the problems begin. 
Despite the appearance of complete analogy and therefore complete 
accord between biological and cultural processes, instructional thinking predicts 
the existence of common cultural traits that actually impede their carrier's sur- 
vival and/or reproduction. For example, it is possible in instructional theory 
for a cultural trait that spreads quickly through a population, while at consider- 
able expense to each carrier, to achieve a higher "instructional fitness" than one 
which spreads more slowly although it enhances organism fitness (I assume this 
is what Feldman and Lewontin, 1975, refer to). This argument, while plausible, 
presents Cloak and the rest of us with a challenge -- to find definitive examples 
of such traits. The appropriate place to begin looking is in the lower right-hand 
corner of my article's Fig. 1 C -  what I consider to be the hypothetical "black 
hole" of cultural behaviors. 
I must confess that I have been unable to fmd even one good example. When 
I first began ruminating on this topic several years ago, a number of anthropolo- 
gist friends suggested to me that primitive warfare was an excellent subject area 
in which to look for behaviors that are culturally maintained though biologically 
maladaptive. One Michigan faculty member insisted that Mundurucfi headhunt- 
ing would be the very case to dissuade me of my illusion. I took their suggestions, 
went to work in the literature, and tried to show that the null hypothesis (Fig. 
1D) cannot be rejected. The only problem is that, to date, I have found no 
compelling evidence that participation in intergroup aggression in primitive so- 
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cieties is maladaptive (Durham, 1976b). Indeed, Mundurucfi headhunting proved 
to be one of the best examples that where first appearances are to the contrary, 
we may simply not have looked hard enough. 
While we await other, definitive counterexamples, I would like to reiterate 
what I believe to be the critical oversight in the biology/culture analogy suggested 
by Cloak and others. We must remember, as Cloak says, that "Every instruction's 
success (or failure) depends upon its environment, which includes every other 
instruction in its biotope -- cultural or genetic -- and the phenotypic outcomes 
thereof, including organisms, behaviors, artifacts, and social forms." I am skep- 
tical of Cloak's arguments for the simple reason that the ongoing evolution of 
cultural instructions takes place in an environment which includes previously 
evolved instructions of all kinds. In these terms, my article essentially pro- 
poses that that the human environment in which culture propagates has, from 
preexisting instructions, an inherent differential selectivity for traits' that en- 
hance organism fitness. The medium, so to speak, is not passively receptive to 
just any smart new cultural instruction that comes along. Rather, I believe the 
medium comes with a strong bias or selection pressure against variants deleteri- 
ous to human fitness. 
Actually, Cloak hints that he may agree with this as a general feature of 
the environment -- but he sees it as a fluke, an "accidental truth" that stems 
from the curious fact that adults generally rear and enculturate their own chil- 
dren. Two comments must be made here. First, it should be obvious from what 
I have said that I do not consider this "near-universal contingent fact" to be the 
sole source of any bias the medium may have. Indeed, I believe there may exist 
three different classes of influences on our receptivity to new cultural instruc- 
tions: (1) enculturated or learned biases (parents, teachers, and friends may in 
many cases teach new carriers to be selective), (2) biological or genetic biases 
(as I say in the article, I am open to the possibility that there may be a struc- 
tural basis to our selectivity for certain kinds of  cultural instructions), and (3) 
circumstantial biases (arising as Cloak suggests from properties of residence and 
kinship systems). Of course, I am in no position to guess at the general, relative 
importance of (1), (2), or (3) behind the "genotypically selfish" selective reten- 
tion I propose. 
Second, as with Ruyle, I simply cannot let Cloak get away without ex- 
amining the very "near-universal contingent fact" on which his argument rests. 
Indeed, by the fifth paragraph this fact creates a serious contradiction that 
seems to call his entire argument into question. There Cloak says that, accord- 
ing to instructional thinking, "A cultural instruction which helped its carrier 
adopt children would be selected for in exactly the same way and be just as 
successful [as the instruction for rearing one's own] ." We must then ask him 
why adoption is not more prevalent within human societies. How did this 
practice of rearing one's own offspring get to be a "near-universal contingent 
fact" if instructional thinking is correct in implying that adoption should be 
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just as successful? It certainly was not through small sample size and drift! 
Cloak's own argument on adoption strongly suggests that there is no "accident" 
involved if cultural instructions often enhance fitness. I fear that his own ex- 
ample boomerangs to support my poin t - -bu t  I would hope in any case that 
some interested reader will take the hint and seriously reinvestigate human 
(and/or nonhuman) adoption practices, asking when (under what circumstances) 
do people adopt children, and why. 
Having said all this, I have a confession to make. My own arguments actu- 
ally do allow the existence of a class of cultural instructions that serve their own 
reproductive ends more than our own. However, in contrast to Cloak, I suggest 
that organism thinking actually predicts what kind of cultural instructions these 
are likely to be. The best place to look for "active parasites" should be the lower 
left-hand corner of Fig. 1C. 
Slobodkin and I apparently have few disagreements regarding the relation- 
ship between biology and culture. Once or twice I get the feeling he misunder- 
stands some of my arguments, but that may not be very serious. For example, he 
claims my predictions about the harvest of energy are not very meaningful "in 
the absence of any documentation that culturally significant behavior is depen- 
dent on observed genetic differences." I hope it is clearer to other readers (1) 
that my comments do not require a genetic basis for culturally significant be- 
havior either in this c.ase or in any other (the confusion here probably stems 
from the customary practice in population genetics of measuring fitness differen- 
tials between genotypes rather than between phenotypes as required in a cultural 
theory), and (2) that the idea of cultural selection actually suggests we would 
find variations in human social behavior to be much more dependent on cultural 
than genetic differences (the reader is again referred to the section on Deter- 
minism). 
Also, I am not sure that I agree with Slobodkin about the importance and 
priority to be given plasticity theories that explain "the genetic mechanisms 
which determine the amount of environmental vs. genetic control" of human be- 
havior. If I am correct in asserting that our cultural and biological attributes have 
coevolved in a complementary fashion, the question of the relative importance 
of  genes and learning is really much less interesting and much less important 
than understanding both the possible adaptive significance of these attributes 
and the limitations of this approach. I fear that the refinement of models for en- 
vironmental vs. genetic control might now only get us further embroiled in instinct 
vs. learning polemics. 
This is perhaps an appropriate place to insert a few words of self-criticism 
about the theory I have proposed. First let me say that I believe the theory's 
strength is its ability to explain the evolution of adaptive cultural behaviors with- 
out presuming a genetic basis or predisposition for everything we do. I believe 
the theory is also adequate for predicting its own limitations and I reemphasize 
that it does not say everything we do is best explained by fitness agruments. On 
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the other hand, I believe my arguments are weakened by several problems be- 
yond those suggested by these reviewers: 
1. The theory in its present formulation overemphasizes the behavioral as- 
pects of  culture. Attention must be given to beliefs, attitudes, thoughts, 
and emotions before a holistic understanding will emerge. Although not 
emphasized in the text, these are dearly key features of human adapta- 
tion and adaptability. 
2. The idea of a selective retention process for cultural evolution presup- 
poses the existence of distinct and identifiable units of culture called 
"cultural traits," "practices," "instructions," etc. I am not sure that the 
analogy of particulate transmission is entirely appropriate for cultural in- 
heritance which lacks the discrete physical manifestation that genetic 
units have. 
3. I have not given sufficient emphasis to the critical distinciion between 
"selfishness" as it is commonly understood and "genotypic selfishness" 
used as a shorthand abbreviation in the article. In no way am I prescrib- 
ing a universal tendency for wanton selfishness, nor can such behavior 
find justification in the theory I propose. On the contrary, it must be re- 
emphasized that sharing, reciprocation, give-and-take, and cooperation 
are generally more adaptive and more common than pure selfishness in 
the social environments of  human beings. 
4. Likewise, I failed to emphasize that "adaptation" need not imply accept- 
ance of and adjustment to a given social and natural environment. In 
particular, a coevolufionary perspective does not imply, as does socio- 
biology for example, that existing social structures are part of an immut- 
able "natural order" to which individuals must adjust or lose out. Rather, 
it implies that these structures must be viewed as an outgrowth of our 
cultural history, which in turn must be seen, in part, as the chronicle of 
struggles for access to and control of  life's sustaining resources. In the 
course of  these struggles, there are times when adaptation may require 
changing the environment. 
5. It is not always clear that I ascribe no conscious intention and no deli- 
berate calculation to the behavior of individual human beings as they 
supposedly go about tending to maximize their fitnesses. It bears re- 
emphasis that such an ambition is assuredly the last thing on our minds 
most of the time. In fact, this may be an important part of happiness and 
peace of mind. 
6. I apologize for any "mentalism and wishy-washiness" in my discussion of 
the limitations of fitness analysis for our understanding of cultural evolu- 
tion. I now realize that only a small handful of  my colleagues ever confused 
the adaptive significance of human behavior with its total significance. 
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ERRATUM 
An unfortunate error was made in the citation of Richard Alexander's 
paper "Incest, Culture, and Natural Selection" in my paper "The Adaptive Signi- 
ficance of Cultural Behavior" (Durham, 1976a). The error was introduced with- 
out my knowledge by changes made after I had read and returned the proofs. 
